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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
;UCHAEL W. McBRIDE, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
TERRY LYNNE JONES (formerly 
known as Terry Lynne McBride) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16650 
'I'his is an action brought by Defendant for modification 
of the final Decree of Divorce entered in Civil No. D-24327 
to award Defendant a share in assets of the marriage or the 
proceeds derived therefrom which were concealed by Plaintiff 
prior to and during the course of the divorce proceeding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment which was based upon two arguments set forth in 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of his Hotion, (1) Plain-
tiff did not in fact commit any fraud or misrepresentation 
and the information given by Plaintiff to Defendant concern-
ing the real property in question was truthful and accurate; 
and (2) even if Plaintiff's representations with respect to 
Land and Cattle Funding, Inc., were fraudulent or misrepresen-
tations, that said representations constitu1e intrinsic fraud 
1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and therefore the Court has no jurisdiction to reopen the 
cause of action between the parties after the final Decree 
of Divorce was entered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the decision of the 
lower court reversed, vacating the Summary Judgment granted 
to Defendant, and to have the case remanded for trial to the 
lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant were husband and wife and the 
parents of six minor children when a Decree of Divorce in 
the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah was 
entered on the 13th day of January, 1977. Said decree was 
final upon being signed by the Judge and filed with the 
Clerk of the Court. Ia the Decree of Divorce the Court 
provided for all aspects incidental to the severance of a 
marriage including specifically, property division as follows: 
"6. The following properties are awarded to 
the Defenaant [wife]: 
a. 24 acres of land in Alpine, Utah to be 
located in the southern most part. 
b. Household furnishings presently in the 
residence at 809 Edgehill, Salt Lake City, Utah 
with the exception of the desk and chair which 
shall be awarded to the Defendant; and 
c. The 1976 GMC truck. 
7. The following properties are awarded to the 
Plaintiff [husband]: 
a. The residence at 809 Edgehill, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
2 
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b. 23 and 3/lOths acres of land in Alpine, 
Utah. 
c. Shoshone Associates Partnership Interests. 
d. Stock in land and cattle funding and 
e. 1976 Porsche (TR30). 
On February 15, 1979, Defendant filed a petition for an 
Order :o Show Cause specifically petitioning the Court to 
equitably divide assets of the marriage alleged by Defendant 
to have been undisclosed by Plaintiff at the time of the 
divorce proceeding. The Petition makes specific reference to 
5,000 acres of real property located in the northern part of 
Utah and southern part of Salt Lake County. Said petition is 
supported by the affidavit of Defendant stating (1) it was 
represented by Plaintiff during the course of the divorce 
proceedings that all properties of the marriage were listed 
in the stipulation or in the family trust and that said 
properties were all the properties owned by the parties and, 
(2) Plaintiff had failed to disclose all of his assets 
including specifically an interest owned by Plaintiff in 
5,000 acres of land located near Alpine, Utah and that 
Defendant believed she was entitled to 1/2 of said real 
property or the proceeds therefrom. (TR 36-37). 
In 1979 the 5,000 acres were sold for $7.5 million. 
The issue herein involves the question of whether Plaintiff 
adequately disclosed his ownership interest in the property 
at the time of the divorce. 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is not disputed by the parties that in 1973 there 
was a limited partnership formed by the name of Alpine 
Limited. The general partner in that limited partnership 
was a general partnership known as Geodyne II. Plaintiff 
owned one-third of Geodyne II; Geodyne I I owned approximately 
one-half of Alpine Limited. Alpine Limited owned some 5,000 
acres of land located at approximately the boundary between 
Salt Lake County and Utah County. Thus. Plaintiff effectively 
owned an approximate 16% interest in the profits and/or losses 
of Alpine Limited. In May of 1973 Plaintiff apparently soM 
a 6% interest in the right to receive the net profits of 
Alpine Limited for ~25,000.00 leaving him with a 10% interest 
in the assets of Alpine Limited. (TR 209-211) 
About 13 months after the divorce the assets of Alpine 
Limited were purchased for ~7.S million dollars (TR 215). 
In answer to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and at Defendant': 
deposition Defendant stated that Plaintiff had made represen-
tations prior to the divorce to her that his interest in an 
investment known as Alpine Limited was worthless. (TR 69, 
246, 259, 262-264, 269-270, 309-311). 
Plaintiff claims however, that in 1974 he contributed 
all of his interest in the net profits of Alpine Limited to 
an Idaho corporation known as Land and Cattle Funding, Inc. 
. . 1 d t "125 ooo.i He further claims that his contribution was va ue a ~ ' 
Plaintiff alleges that by the fall of 1975 Land and Cattle 
Funding, Inc. lost everything and at the time of the divorce 
4 
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in December of 1976 tne corporation was worthless. 
llO, 210-212). 
(';.'R 109-
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he owned 
100% of the stock of Land and Cattle Funding, Inc. at the 
time the corporation ceased doing business, that he has 
personally paid some $30,000.00 of the liabilities of Land 
and Cattle Funding, Inc. and that he intends to pay an 
additional $20,000.00 of the debts of this corporation and 
as sole snareholder he is entitled to any proceeds derived 
from the assets of Land and Cattle Funding, Inc. which con-
sist of the aforementioned interest in Alpine Limited and the 
name Land and Cattle Funding, Inc. 
35-38, 46-50). 
(McBride deposition pp. 
It is tne position of Plaintiff McBride that: (a) his 
statements and representations to Defendant were true to 
the effect that the family interest in Alpine Limited was 
worthless; (b) that even if the information supplied by 
Plaintiff to Defendant concerning the assets of the marriage 
was inaccurate and/or fraudulent that Defendant did not 
rely on said statements and representations, and (c) if 
nis statements and representations were fraudulent that 
inasmuch as che statements were made in December 1976 and 
a final Decree of Divorce was entered in January 1977 that 
any fraud perpetra-r.eu by Plaintiff is to be characterized 
as intrinsic fraud rather than extrinsic fraud and that 
according to case law a judgment may not be overturned be-
5 
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cause of intrinsic fraud. 
It is Defendant's position that (1) Defendant had 
presented an issue of fact which precluded the entry 
of summary judgment on the issues before the court; (2) 
that in fact Plaintiff McBride had never placed the 
Alpine Limited asset into the corporation or that if he 
had actually contributed this asset to the corporation he 
had misrepresented the value of the Land and Cattle Fundi~, 
Inc. at the time of the divorce. (See TR 109-110); (3) that 
Plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment 
of assets constitute extrinsic fraud which may be the basis 
for set~ing aside a final judgment; and, (4) the fiduciary 
relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant required full 
disclosure and entitled Defendant as the spouse in the 
weaker position to rely upon the representations of the 
party with superior knowledge. 
ISSUE 
The district court erred in finding that extrinsic 
fraud could not possibly have been committed by Plaintiff on 
Defendant in misrepresenting the value of the assets of the 
marriage and in concealing assets of the marriage from Defendan: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS A GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO WHETHER OR 
i>lOT PLAINTIFF MADE A FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTA-
TION TO DEFENDANT. 
Although Plaintiff contends that he contributed his 
6 .. 
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interests in Alpine Limited to a corporation called Land and 
cattle Funding Inc., it is important to point out that 
Defendant has never admitted that such a transfer in fact 
took place. Whether the Alpine Limited interests belonged 
to Land and Cattle Funding Inc., a corporation owned entirely 
by Plaintiff or whether the interest was owned by Plaintiff 
directly makes little difference. Either Plaintiff McBride 
never placed the Alpine Limited asset in the corporation 
Land and Cattle Funding, Inc., and thereby concealed that 
asset from Defendant or if he did contribute the asset to 
the corporation he misrepresented the value of the corpora-
tion to Defendant. The point of Defendant's claim is that 
this interest in whatever form was represented to Defendant 
by Plaintiff as being worthless and Defendant has produced 
evidence to support the proposition that the property did 
indeed have value in 1973, in 1975 and in 1978. 
It is admitted by the parties that in 1973 an interest 
in Alpine Limited equalling less than half of the property 
was sold for $200,000.00 ~lus an agreement to pay all con-
tract balances. (McBride depo. pp. 7-d). This supports 
Defendant's contention that the entire Alpine Limited inter-
est was worth approximately $3,000,000.00 in 1975. Likewise 
it is uncontested that in 1978 the property was purchased for 
$7,soo,ooo.oo and Plaintiff McBride will receive 10% of that 
sale. 1 
1 . ·11· Alµine Limited did not receive $7.5 mi ion. 
$L.5 million is or way to be paid to Plaintiff 
commission. Defendant's claim relates only to 
received by Alpine Limited. 
7 
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Plaintiff produced no evidence of the value of the property 
as of the time when the divorce was granted. As the party 
moving for surrunary judgment he has the burden of taking all 
the evidence before the Court, considering it in a light 
most favorable to Defendant and proving that the represent~ 
tions made by him to Defendant at the time of the divorce 
proceeding and prior thereto were truthful and accurate. 
Defendant has no duty to present evidence as to this value 
until the time of trial. Defendant has failed by affidavit 
or other sworn averment to controvent the allegations in 
sworn averments submitted by Defendant in support of her 
petition. 
Summary judgment for Defendant as granted by the lower 
court was improper and contrary to Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. and 
the large body of opinion supplementing that rule. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case, Sandberg vs. Klein, 
576 P.2d 291, (Utah 1978) stated: 
"A surrunary judgment can only be granted under 
Rule 56(c), u.R.C.P., when it is shown there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment, as a matter 
of law under the operative facts. The Court 
cannot' consider the weight of testimony or th7 
credibility of witnesses in considering a motio~ 
for surrunary judgmept. Herein although th~ parties 
were not in complete conflict as to certain facts, 
the understanding, intention, and consequences of 
those facts were vigorously disputed. These 29 1. 
matters can only be resolved by a trial. Pg. 
In the case of Holbrook co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 
(Utah 1975) this Court held: 
8 
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"It only takes one sworn statement under 
oath to dispute the averments on the other side of 
the contr~versy and create an issue of fact. . • . 
If there is any dispute as to any issue, material 
to the settlement of the controversy, the summary 
Judgment should not be granted. Pg. 193. 
In the instant matter Plaintiff has submitted by Affidavit 
(TR 36-37) by Answers to Interrogatories (TR 68-71, 114-121, 
and by Deposition (TR. 246, 259, 262-264, 269-270, and 309-
311) sworn averments disputing the issues and allegations 
raised by Plaintiff. Defendant has averred under oath that 
she relied upon statements made to her during the course of 
marriage and also communications between counsel all setting 
forth as a fact the negative net worth financial condition 
of Alpine Liwited. Defendant submits that in such a situation 
tne lower court could not find as a matter of law that no 
extrinsic fraud could have been committed by Plaintiff. 
(The issues of extrinsic v. intrinsic fraud will be dis-
cussed supra). 
In light of the foregoing, Defendant submits that the 
Court holding in western Pacific Transport Co. v. Beehive State 
Agricultural Co-op, No. 16056 (Utah, filed June 26, 1979) 
states the applicable law with respect to this case. 
"We are entirely cognizant of the advantages of 
the summary judgment procedure in saving the time, 
effort and expense of trial when it clearly 
appears that there are no disputed issues of 
material facts and the Court can therefore move 
for the moving parties as a matter ~f law 7 
However, the granting of such a motion fails of 
that objective and hoped for advantages are not 
only lost, but there actually results a greater 
9 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
e~panditu~e of time and effort if there are such 
disputed i~sue~ to be resolved and the granting f 
such a motion is ~ot justified. From what has be~ 
set forth above, it should be plain that in this 
case ~here are such disputed issues which ought to 
be ~ried. The motion was improperly granted and 
it is necessary that the case be remanded for 
trial. Cost to Appellant (Defendant). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS 
AND CONCEALMENT OF ASSETS PRIOR TO THE DIVORCE 
PROCEEDING CONSTITUTE EXTRINSIC FRAUD. 
Plaintiff's position as set forth in pleadings to the 
lower court is that the divorce decree entered by the court 
January 13, 1977 can be modified only if the alleged fraudu-
lent misrepresentations of Plaintiff constitute extrinsic 
fraud rather than intrinsic fraud. Defendant, contends that 
a statement contained in the correspondence from James A. 
Murphy, counsel for Plaintiff to Joseph L. Henriod, counsel 
for Defendant, dated December 6, 1976: 
"Stock in Land and Cattle Funding. At this 
time the corporation is in very poor condition and 
has a negative net worth". 
could only constitute extrinsic fraud, namely in so respond-
ing to Defendant's request for information regarding assets, 
made tnrough her counsel, Plaintiff's counsel responded witl 
the above quoted statement which constitutes misrepresen~­
tion and extrinsic fraud in that either the Alpine Limited 
interest was not contributed to Land and Cattle Funding, Inc., 
and thereby concealed or if it was contributed the value of 
the corporation was misrepresented. 
10 
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It is clear that said alleged misrepresentation consists 
of a statement in a letter exchanged between counsel and 
that it it not perjured testimony or a false answer to an 
interrogatory. Nevertheless Plaintiff claims said misrepre-
sentation constitutes intrinsic fraud and as such is insufficient 
to enable this Court to set aside the divorce decree. 
careful examination of the case law setting forth 
elements of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud shows that that 
alleged misrepresentation contained in correspondence between 
counsel constitutes extrinsic fraud and there is no question 
but that the representations made by Plaintiff to Defendant 
during the course of the marriage concerning said asset 
constitute extrinsic fraud. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Haner v. Haner, 
13 u.2d 299, 373 P.2d 577, (1962), Plaintiff appealed from 
an order denying her motion to set aside or modify a divorce 
decree which had been granted to Defendant. The court 
stated that: 
"In order to justify granting relief the alleged wrong would 
have to be of the type characterized as extrinsic fraud:" 
The Court then defined "extrinsic fraud" as: 
"Fraud based on conduct or activities outside of 
the court proceedings themselves; which.is de-
priving the other party of the op~ortunity to 
present his claim or defense. This type of fraud 
which is regarded as a fraud not only upon the 
opponent, but upon the court itself, can be . 
accomplished in a number of ways, such as making 
false statements or representations to the other 
party or to witnesses to prevent them from con-
11 
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~esting the issues; or by that means or 
preventing the attendance of parties or 
or.by d~stroying or secreting evidence; 
fair trial of the issues is effectively 
373 P.2d at 578, 579. 
otherwise 
witnesses 
so that a 
prevented. 
This is precisely the issue presented to the c t b our y Defendan: 
in her petition. Defendant has specifically alleged that 
Plaintiff made false statements to her and that through his 
counsel he made a false representation to her counsel concern· 
ing the value of an asset with the intent to prevent her 
from examining that asset more closely in order to secrete 
an asset whic~ should have been divided between the parties. 
In Haner the court found that the Defendant had "admitted 
that accusations in his pleadings and at that trial . . . 
were not true . II (373 P.2d at 579). The court held that 
"Inasmuch as the parties and their witnesses were 
present and these issues were contested during the 
trial, if there were in fact mis representations 
and fraud, . they would have occurred within 
the trial itself (thus intrinsic to it) and there-
fore would not have been of the type of fraud 
characterized as extrinsic fraud explained above. 
(emphasis added). 373 P.2d at 579. 
The question of the value of the asset of the marriage 
in Alpine Limited was not contested during the trial specifica: 
because of the representations which constitute the basis 
for Defendant's petition. It is clear that the alleged 
fraudulent misrepresentations are based on conduct outside 
of the court proceeding itself. Plaintiff in this case 
fraudulently prevented the matter of settlement of the 
· t · 11 of Plai· nti' ff' s assets to be contested parties interes in a 
and prevented Defendant from the opportunity to make a cla~ 
to the concealed assets. 
12 d 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In Glover v. Glover, 242 P.2d 298, 121 Utah 362 (1952) 
the Plaintiff brought an action seeking to modify a prior 
divorce decree on the basis that due to the misrepresentations 
and conduct of the Defendant certain real property was not 
included in the property settlement. Plaintiff claimed that 
the Defendant "fraudulently and deceitfully prevented the 
matter of settlement of the parties property rights to come 
before the Court " 242 P.2d at 299. 
In defining extrinsic fraud in Glover the Utah Supreme 
court quoted A.L.R. Annotation, Vol. 113, p. 235 as follows: 
"Extrinsic fraud must consist of some act ulterior 
to the merits of the proceedings out of which the 
the judgment arose, by which the party attacking 
the judgment was prevented from presenting his 
case of was induced not to present it. Such fraud 
consists of something done by the successful party 
preventing the adverse party from presenting all 
of his case to the court, so that there was, in 
fact, no adversary trial or decision of the issue 
in that case. 242 P.2d at 299. 
The court then quoted Vol. 88 A.L.R. p. 1201 which 
states in pertinent part: 
[I]n the case of extrinsic fraud, relief is 
granted on the theory that such fraud has pre-
vented the unsuccessful party from fully pre-
senting his case, and hence that there has never 
been a real contest before the court on the sub-
J ect matter of this suit. 242 P.2d at 300. 
In Glover, the Plaintiff did not bring t~e property to 
the Court's attention because of her reliance upon a private 
agreement which as it later turned out, Defendant had no in-
tention of keeping. The court then quoted the leading 
United States supreme court case of United States v. Throckmorton, 
% 11.S. 61, 25 L.Ed 93, 
13 
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"Where ~~e.u~successful party has been presented 
from e~nibiting fully his case, by fraud or 
~ece~t~on practiced on him by his opponent . . , 
in similar cases which show that there has never 
been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the 
case, .are reasons for which a new suit may be 
sustained to set aside and anull the former 
judment or decree and open the case for a new and 
fair hearing. 242 P.2d at 300. 
based on the foregoing the Court in Glover found that the 
misrepresentations of the Defendant constituted extrinsic 
fraud. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Clissold v. Clissold, 519 
P.2d 242 (Utah 1974) defined extrinsic fraud as "those 
actions asserted to be fraudulent which prevent a fair 
submission of the controversy . II The Court defined 
intrinsic fraud as "conduct asserted to be fraudulent which 
occurs during the course of the proceedings ... " 519 P.2d 
at 242. 
The Court in Clissold was careful to point out that 
"exceptions [to the rule requiring extrinsic fraud] exist ~ 
divorce cases where there has been a gross misrepresentation 
of assets by a party." 519 P.2d at 242. 
It is clear that the alleged fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions of Plaintiff Michael McBride occurred outside of any 
court or other adversary hearing or proceeding. Certain 
assets were concealed from Defendant prior to preparation of 
the stipulation and hence she was deprived of the opportuniey 
to contest her interest in such concealed assets. The 
· t t · re clearly extrinsic. 
alleged fraudulent misrepresen a ions a 
14 
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POINT III 
THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUSBAND 
AND WIFE REQUIRES FULL DISCLOSURE AND ENTITLES THE 
SPOUSE IN THE WEAKER POSITION TO RELY UPON THE 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE PARTY WITH SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE. 
The rule of law is f irmlv established in Utah that a 
husband who is in a suoerior and stronaer Position to have 
knowledae of the assets of the marriaae has a fiduciarv dutv 
to fullv and fairlv disclose this information to his wife. 
In Glover su0ra. the court held 
"Plaintiff [was entitled tol an OPPOrtunitv to 
invoke the oowers of a court of aeneral iuris 
diction to include within a Prior divorce decree 
the orooertv riahts of the oarties. normallv 
included therein. but omitted in this case because 
of the alleaed fraud of the defendant. As stated 
in Peterson v. Budae. 35 Utah 596. 102 Pac. 211. 
215: "there is no rule of law more fullv estab-
lished than that which holds that transactions 
between oersons occuovina fiduciarv or confidential 
relations with each other. in which the stronaer 
or superior oartv obtains an advantaae over the 
other. cannot be uoheld." 242 P.2d at 300. 
In Palmer v. Palmer. 26 Utah 31. 72 Pac. 3 (1903). the 
Utah Suoreme Court found that the husband had kept his wife 
in ianorance of the value and amounts received as Proceeds 
from certain orooertv and that the execution of the seJaration 
aareement bv the wife would not be bindina UPOn her because 
it had been obtained throuah unfair advantaae and unwarranted 
coersion. 
A review of the record on aooeal shows that Plaintiff 
keot Defendant misinformed and uninformed concernina the assets 
of the marriage and his business dealings. (See Jones Deposi-
tion, TR 309-311). 
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Speaking of the fiduciary duty owed by a husband to his 
wife in that case the Supreme Court stated: 
"Not only the law, but a man's most sacred 
honor, as well as every principal of justice and 
equity demands that he treat his wife at all 
times, and under all circumstances, respectfully 
fairly, and openly .... [the husband] had no ' 
right to conceal himself or anything relating to 
their affairs from her. 26 Utah at 48, 49. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-Appellant submits that based upon the sworn 
averments, evidence, and argument presented to the lower court 
it was improper for the court to rule as a matter of law 
eitner that all representations made by Plaintiff to Defen-
dant prior to and during the divorce proceedings were acc~a~ 
and truthful or that there was no extrinsic fraud committed 
by Plaintiff in making misrepresentations as to the existence 
or value of assets of the marriage to Defendant prior to and 
during the divorce proceeding. 
1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ day of ~ 
h L. Henriod 
Ear Jay Peck 
Stephen L. Henriod ( 
NIELSEN, HENRI OD, GOTTFREDSON & PE: 
400 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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